California\u27s Insurance Regulation Revolution: The First Two Years of Proposition 103 by Sugarman, Stephen D.
San Diego Law Review 
Volume 27 
Issue 3 1990 Article 3 
9-1-1990 
California's Insurance Regulation Revolution: The First Two Years 
of Proposition 103 
Stephen D. Sugarman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephen D. Sugarman, California's Insurance Regulation Revolution: The First Two Years of Proposition 
103, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 683 (1990). 
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol27/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, 
please contact digital@sandiego.edu. 
California's Insurance Regulation
Revolution: The First Two Years of
Proposition 103
STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN*
Editor's Note: Issue 26:5 of this law review was devoted to a sym-
posium of views on tort law and no-fault alternatives to auto in-
surance. Some of the articles in that issue were the result of a
panel discussion held at the University of San Diego on the vari-
ous insurance initiatives on the California ballot in November
1988. In the following article, Professor Sugarman looks at the
victorious insurance initiative, Proposition 103, two years after its
passage by the California voters.
In November 1988 the voters of California passed Proposition
103, which promised dramatic changes in the way automobile and
other insurance policies are regulated, priced and sold in the state.
Proposition 103 also promised an immediate and significant reduc-
tion in the cost of property and casualty insurance. Put before the
voters by a populist consumer group, Proposition 103 drew on the
public sentiment that people were paying too much and getting too
little for their insurance dollars. It was also seen as a fresh, con-
sumer-oriented reform in a political climate in which the tradition-
ally powerful interests - the insurance industry and the lawyers
who represent claimants in accident cases - had produced only leg-
islative impasse. Controversial from the start, in the two years since
its adoption Proposition 103 has primarily provided employment for
lawyers, actuaries and expert witnesses in the field of insurance.
Many of its key provisions have yet to be implemented, and, looking
down the road, there is good reason to doubt that any of its substan-
tive goals will be achieved absent additional changes in the law.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall). B.S. 1964,
J.D. 1967, Northwestern University.
This article first addresses the "torts crisis" and the legislative
deadlock from which Proposition 103 and four competing initiatives
emerged. Proposition 103's provisions are then discussed, followed by
a description of the attempts at implementation over the past two
years, and the battles that took place between the Insurance Com-
missioner, the insurance industry, and supporters of Proposition 103.
Finally, because many have now concluded that the central goals of
Proposition 103 cannot be achieved without a more fundamental
change in the underlying torts system, the article closes with an ex-
amination of several reform proposals that have recently been put
forward.
I. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CLIMATE FROM WHICH
PROPOSITION 103 EMERGED
A. The Torts Crisis
Throughout America during the mid 1980s, there was much talk
of a "tort law crisis." Advocates for some insurance companies, phy-
sicians, corporations and local governmental units claimed that the
personal injury law and liability insurance system was out of con-
trol.1 Suddenly, many enterprises and individuals faced enormous in-
creases (frequently well in excess of one hundred percent) in their
liability insurance premiums, and others could not purchase liability
insurance at any price. In the face of these problems, the insurance
industry and its customers (referred to as the "defense side" of the
tort system) formed a loose coalition to lobby for changes in tort law.
They hoped that these changes would lead to the return of price sta-
bility and readily available liability insurance. Although the focus of
the insurance crisis was product liability, medical malpractice and
municipal liability insurance, many of the reforms pushed by the de-
fense side would affect all personal injury plaintiffs, including those
involved in auto accidents.
These proposed reforms have included: (a) a limit on the amount
of money that can be awarded by juries for pain and suffering in
personal injury cases; (b) a limit on the amount of contingent fees
that plaintiffs' attorneys may charge in personal injury cases; (c) the
elimination of joint and several liability, so that in cases of multiple
defendants, a single defendant is responsible only for damages in
proportion to its share of the fault; (d) the reversal of the collateral
source rule so that tort law no longer compensates for losses already
1. U.S. ATTY. GEN. TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, REPORT ON THE CAUSES, Ex-
TENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AF-
FORDABILITY (1986); see also Sugarman, Taking Advantage of the Torts Crisis, 48
OHIO ST. L.J. 329 (1987). See generally, LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY (R.
Litan & C. Winston eds. 1988).
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covered by basic social insurance and employee benefits; and (e) lim-
itations on punitive damages.
Some consumer advocates and lawyers who represent personal in-
jury victims fiercely opposed limitations on victims' tort rights.2 They
charged that the insurance crisis was the fault of the insurance in-
dustry - either that it was a "manufactured" crisis designed to al-
low the defense side to achieve certain anti-victim legislative goals,
or that, if the crisis was real, it happened because of careless or reck-
less past underwriting, pricing and investment practices of the indus-
try. Moreover, they began a counter-attack, seeking legislation that
would increase the regulation of liability insurers. As the battle
heated up,3 many in the insurance industry probably began to regret
that this political fight was ever started.
Political battles raged in state legislatures throughout the United
States and in Congress, and, as a result, many changes were actually
enacted in a large number of jurisdictions." In California, frustrated
with its lack of success in the legislature, the insurance industry and
other defense interests successfully promoted a modest initiative that
the voters passed in June 1986. Called Proposition 51, this measure
limited the liability of so-called "deep pockets" for pain and suffer-
ing awards in multiple wrongdoer cases by restricting the scope of a
single defendant's responsibility to pay for non-economic losses to
that defendant's share of the fault. This victory in hand, the defense
side returned to the legislature asking for more tort reform and
threatening more sweeping initiative campaigns. However, the law-
yers on the plaintiffs' side and their allies in the legislature dug in
their heels and threatened insurance reform initiatives of their own.6
The result was an unusual compromise that was forged in Septem-
ber 1987. A modest set of legislative reforms was accompanied by
the well-publicized signing of an agreement by the most important
2. See, e.g., Nader, The Corporate Drive to Restrict Their Victims' Rights, 22
GONZ. L. REV. 15 (1986).
3. See generally, STATE OF FLORIDA ACADEMIC TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE
INSURANCE AND TORT SYSTEMS, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINAL-FINDING RE-
PORT ON INSURANCE AND TORT SYSTEMS (1988). Early in this time period, Florida
passed a package of laws that both changed tort law and imposed more controls on insur-
ers in that state.
4. See generally, U.S. ATTY. GEN. TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP. AN UPDATE
ON THE LIABILITY CRISIS (1987); S. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY
LAW 75-99 (1989).
5. Proposition 51 was codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1990).
6. Reich, Insurers, Lawyers Prepare for a New Round of Conflict, L.A. Times,
Nov. 30, 1986, § 1, at 3, col. 3.
lobbying interests involved: the insurance coalition and the Califor-
nia Trial Lawyers Association. This agreement in effect called a
truce whereby all the parties agreed for five years to cease pressing
for further legal change, either in the legislature or through the initi-
ative process.7 However, the truce was short-lived. Soon, several in-
terest groups were circulating initiative petitions dealing with tort
law, insurance law or both.
B.. Who Was Behind Proposition 103?
Groups that were excluded from the "peace treaty" realized that
further legislative efforts on their part would likely be unproductive
in the short run and turned instead to the initiative process. Follow-
ers of consumer advocate Ralph Nader drafted an initiative petition
premised on Nader's theory that the country needed sweeping and
much tighter insurance regulation, not tort reform.' This petition
also included specific provisions ordering dramatic price reductions
in auto insurance - well designed to win public support from those
more interested in consequences than underlying causes., This initia-
tive became Proposition 103 which was the only one of five insurance
and tort law initiatives on the November 1988 ballot to pass.
Nader, who is based in Washington D.C., has a long-standing na-
tional reputation as a liberal reformer. 10 Despised by many in the
business community,"' Nader, perhaps because of his own ascetic
lifestyle, appears to have the confidence of a large share of the pub-
lic. Through the years, many Nader followers, with his support and
encouragement, have started consumer organizations of their own.
One of those groups, based in California and formed in the fall of
1986,12 calls itself Access to Justice or, sometimes, Voter Revolt to
Cut Insurance Rates (or just Voter Revolt). Its leaders supervised
the drafting of Proposition 103. The general outlines of this initiative
7. Weintraub, Lobbyists, Lawyers Cut Deal on Injury Liability, L.A. Times,
Sept. 12, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 1; see also, Glastris, Frank Fat's Napkin, WASH.
MONTHLY, Dec. 1987, at 19. The "peace treaty" also sought to make it difficult for those
not party to the agreement to place an initiative on the ballot because it included con-
tracts entered into with the state's two leading initiative petition signature gathering or-
ganizations designed to limit their ability to work for insurance and tort reform initia-
tives promoted by others. See Reich, Lobby Contracts Seen as Barrier to Foes' Ballot
Hopes, L.A. Times, Nov. 12, 1987, § 1, at 3, col. 3.
8. Nader, The Assault in Injured Victims' Rights, 64 DEN. U.L. REv. 625(1988).
9. A mid-1988 poll found that 77% of California motorists believed they spent
too much on auto insurance. See Heat and Hostility, L.A. Times, July 10, 1988, § 5, at
4, col. 1.
10. See, e.g., Blum, 'Raiders' at 20 Look Forward, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 8, 1990, at 24.
11. For recent attempts to discredit Nader, see Brimelow & Spencer, Ralph Na-
der, Inc., FORBES, Sept. 17, 1990, at 117, and Crovitz, Ralph Nader Is a Bargain for
Trial Lawyers at $1,000 a Table, Wall Street J., Nov. 14, 1990, § A, at 15, col. 3.
12. Reich, supra note 6.
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campaign were announced even prior to the "peace treaty," when in
June 1987, on the first anniversary of Proposition 51, Nader spoke
out against its failure to lower insurance rates significantly.' 3
C. The Competing Initiatives
Learning of the Nader-backed petition, the liability insurance in-
dustry decided that it should prepare an initiative petition of its
own. 14 It chose an auto no-fault plan as the centerpiece of its propo-
sal. Like the Nader group that gave special attention to auto insur-
ance rates, the industry knew there was great concern among motor-
ists generally about the recent rapid rise in auto insurance costs
(said to have increased an average of forty percent in the course of
the previous three years). 15 The industry must have concluded that it
stood the best chance of winning over the public by convincing voters
that its reform plan, which directly attacked the problem of insur-
ance costs rising faster than the cost of living, would most sensibly
and genuinely lead to lower rates.
The auto no-fault idea was politically hot in the United States for
about ten years between 1965 and 1975, during which time some-
what fewer than half of the states adopted some sort of no-fault
plan.16 This type of reform was initially promoted by law professors
as a way to cut auto insurance rates and at the same time expand
the proportion of auto accident victims who would be compensated.Y
13. See Wolinsky, Nader Assails Deep-Pockets Initiative as 'Hoax' on Public,
L.A. Times, June 5, 1987, § 1, at 3, col. 4. For details of an earlier threat to use the
initiative process by Access to Justice, see Rosenfield, Prop. 51 Sets Stage for Fight on
Regulating State Insurers, L.A. Times, Jan. 11, 1987, § 5, at 3, col. 1. For an early
report on Proposition 103, see Reich, Planned Initiative Threatens Trust of Insurers,
Lawyers, L.A. Times, Nov. 19, 1987, § 1, at 3, col. 4. Nader first endorsed the initiative
in January 1988. Reich, Nader Backs 'Voter Revolt' Over Insurance, Takes Swipe at
Lawyers, L.A. Times, Jan. 30, 1988, § 1, at 29, col. 1.
14. For an account of how the five competing initiatives were brought to a vote,
written by the leading political consultant to the pro-Proposition 103 forces, see Zimmer-
man, Insurance Referendum: $60 Million War in California, 247 NATION 449 (1988).
For details concerning the early scrambling for backers and signatures by the competing
groups, see Reich, Bid to Qualify 5 Insurance Initiatives Is in High Gear, L.A. Times,
Feb. 15, 1988, § 1, at 3, col. 5.
15. Reich, Nader's Prop. 103 Wins But Insurance Industry Files Court Challenge,
L.A. Times, Nov. 9, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
16. See O'Connell & Beck, An Update of the Surveys on the Operation of No-
Fault Auto Laws, INS. L.J. 129 (1979); U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., COMPENSATING AUTO
ACCIDENT VICTIMS: A FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE EXPER-
IENCES (1985) [hereinafter COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS].
17. Most important was R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE
TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965).
These goals could be achieved if most cases could be handled on a
first party insurance basis (i.e., you claim from your own insurer)
outside the tort system and without the involvement of lawyers. The
plan, however, would take away from victims of non-serious auto
crashes their right to sue for pain and suffering damages. As it
turned out, only New York and Michigan (and arguably one or two
other states) adopted no-fault plans that significantly achieved the
original objectives. In many of the other states (thanks often to the
effective political pressure of the plaintiffs' bar) auto no-fault merely
added a small amount of first party protection to the existing
scheme. As a result, in some states insurance costs actually in-
creased, in part because victims could use their no-fault benefits to
help finance their tort suits.18
The insurance industry's proposal, Proposition 104,19 was said to
be modeled after New York's auto no-fault plan. Yet, Proposition
104 was unattractive to many of those who generally favor auto no-
fault for two main reasons. First, although it would "have removed
auto accident claims from the tort system as in New York's law, its
first party benefits to auto accident victims would have been less gen-
erous.20 Apparently, the industry adopted this solution so it could
fairly claim that Proposition 104 would lead to substantially reduced
auto insurance rates.21 However, leading consumer groups could
hardly be expected to support a plan with skimpy benefits. Second,
Proposition 104 also contained several provisions largely unrelated to
auto no-fault that would cement into state law (requiring a two-
thirds vote of the legislature to change them) certain existing insur-
ance laws that the industry wanted to keep. These "goodies" re-en-
forced the view of many that the industry was being greedy. They
were included, however, as a direct response to Nader's Proposition
103, which was designed to change these same provisions. The insur-
ance industry was clearly hoping that if both initiatives passed and
Proposition 104 gained the most votes, its insurance provisions would
18. COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS, supra note 16.
19. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET. GENERAL ELECTION, Nov. 8, 1988, at 102
[hereinafter BALLOT PAMPHLET].
20. For example, Proposition 104 would have provided up to $10,000 for medical
expenses and up to $15,000 for lost wages. New York, by contrast, provides up to
$50,000 of no-fault benefits, of which up to $36,000 can be used for income loss. N.Y.
INS. LAW § 5102 (MeKinney 1985).
21. Indeed, Proposition 104 would have mandated a 20% reduction in certain
rates for two years. Currently, about half of the auto insurance payouts in California are
for damage to cars, the other half for bodily injury. Only about a third of the bodily
injury payouts replace actual dollar losses of the victims. Hence, one goal of no-fault is to
shrink sharply the remainder of the existing payouts - those that go for pain and suffer-
ing and that duplicates other sources of recovery. It has recently been argued that a
strong no-fault plan should cut rates about 17%. See Kittel, Auto Insurance: Defusing
the Bomb; Controlling Cost Increases, 91 BEST'S REV.: PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE
EDITION 22 (1990).
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thereby nullify Proposition 103.22
Auto no-fault historically had a mixed reception in the auto insur-
ance industry. The November 1988 ballot season was to be no excep-
tion. A single auto insurer (Coastal Insurance Company) backed and
largely financed a different initiative petition that became Proposi-
tion 101.12 Coastal sought to reduce auto insurance rates by limiting
awards for pain and suffering in less serious auto accident cases
(often called "whiplash" claims), by restricting claimant attorney's
fees in auto accident cases, and by no longer compensating auto ac-
cident victims for losses covered by other sources such as social in-
surance and employee benefits. Coastal was an important participant
in the segment of the market that caters to high risk drivers. Its
executives apparently concluded that Proposition 101's features
would be beneficial to it in ways that Proposition 104 would not.
As Nader's followers were preparing their initiative, other con-
sumer interests and associates of the state's Attorney General (who
also felt locked out of the legislative process as a result of the
"truce") drafted another insurance regulation package that was of
the same general sort as Proposition 103, but less radical in its
reach. In order to help assure it a place on the ballot and to find a
source of funds to promote it during the campaign, these groups
teamed up with the plaintiffs' lawyers. Their joint proposal became
Proposition 100.24 The plaintiffs' lawyers made sure that Proposition
100 also contained a provision designed to maintain the traditional
tort system and keep no-fault out of the realm of auto accidents (in
direct conflict with Proposition 104).25 They also added a provision
designed to prevent the future regulation of attorney fees.26 Yet an-
other provision would overturn a recent California Supreme Court
decision that limited the rights of auto accident victims to sue a de-
fendant's insurer for punitive and emotional harm damages resulting
22. Regarding passage of conflicting initiatives see CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(b).
See also, Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n,
No. S012016 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 1990) (LEXIS, Cal. Library) (interpreting that
section).
23. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 19, at 90. For a description of Coastal's in-
volvement, see Zimmerman, supra note 14.
24. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 19, at 86. For a description of the involve-
ment of the Attorney General and the plaintiffs' bar, see Zimmerman, supra note 14.
25. Section 15 provided, in part: "It is the will of the People that persons who
wrongfully cause damages to others in the ownership or operation of a motor vehicle
should be held legally responsible for the full extent of the injuries they cause." BALLOT
PAMPHLET, supra note 19, at 134.
26. Id. at 135.
from an insurer's bad faith conduct of settlement negotiations.
Playing the same game as their chief rivals, the Attorney General
and the trial lawyers hoped that their package would attract more
votes than the insurance industry's Proposition 104, so that Proposi-
tion 100 would dominate and invalidate Proposition 104 even if the
latter also won a majority vote. As part of its appeal, Proposition 100
also promised immediate reductions in auto insurance rates. Instead
of a truce, suddenly there was all-out war.28
Indeed, faced with the prospect of Proposition 100, the insurance
industry and other defense interests responded with yet another initi-
ative that became Proposition 106.29 Proposition 106 would have
sharply limited attorneys' fees in personal injury cases. Once more,
the defense side may have hurt itself by appearing to be too greedy.
The specifics of Proposition 106 put off many who generally favored
the regulation of plaintiff attorneys' fees, but who felt that the re-
strictions in this initiative were far too stringent as compared, for
example, with those governing lawsuits in California in medical mal-
practice cases. 30
Through the spring of 1988 the legislature, the lawyers, and fhe
insurers struggled to reach yet another legislative compromise that
would head off the initiative war. Time ran out, however, and sud-
denly five initiative propositions were slated for the ballot. In spite of
the obvious short-run gains either side would achieve if its initiative
passed, also of importance is the larger view of these battles between
insurers and trial attorneys. Imposing large financial costs on the
other side by forcing it to participate in an initiative campaign, if
only to maintain its current position, can impact upon that side's
ability to mount another initiative campaign in the future or to con-
tinue pursuing its regular political agenda in the state legislature
through large financial contributions to candidates. 31
With Nader's endorsement but very little money, Voter Revolt
had organized a signature gathering campaign to qualify Proposition
27. Section 13 of Proposition 100 sought to overturn Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988), which limited
an insured's ability to sue an insurer for bad faith. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 19, at
134.
28. For an account of the peace treaty breaking up, see Reich, Lawyers, Insurers
- Truce May Be Fading, L.A. Times, Dec. 16, 1987, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
29. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 19, at 110.
30. Proposition 106 would have limited the contingent fees to 25% of the first
$50,000 recovered, 15% of the next $50,000 recovered, and 10% of any amount recov-
ered in excess of $100,000. By contrast, the limits in medical malpractice cases are 40%
of the first $50,000 recovered, 33.3% of the next $50,000 recovered, 25% of the next
$500,000 recovered, and 15 % of any amount recovered in excess of $600,000. CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1990).
31. See generally, Reich, Insurance Firms' Gifts to Governor, Legislators Told,
L.A. Times, May 17, 1988, § 1, at 3, col. 5; Reich, Insurance Lobby Study Cites Large
Gifts to Politicians by Trial Lawyers, L.A. Times, June 20, 1987, § 2, at 3, col. 1.
690
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103 for the ballot that critically relied upon a direct mail strategy.
Once all the initiatives qualified for the ballot, backers of the propos-
als other than Proposition 103 spent a great deal of money promot-
ing their initiatives (and opposing the others). In contrast, the back-
ers of Proposition 103 spent relatively little and relied upon putting
their side forward in news accounts of the increasingly bitter cam-
paign.3 2 Proposition 103 was the only winner."3
D. Who Voted for Proposition 103?
Proposition 103 narrowly passed - by a 51 to 49 percent mar-
gin.3 4 One possible explanation for its passage is that, on balance,
Californians bought the Nader faction's negative portrayal of the in-
surance industry and ideologically agreed with its vision of progres-
sive reform. Also, at some level, no doubt, Nader himself made the
key difference. In addition, Proposition 103 was probably helped by
the well-publicized fact that the insurance industry spent so much
money on this election-money, the other side contended, that could
be used to reduce insurance costs instead.
35
An alternative view of the election is that many people simply
voted with their pocketbooks; supporters hoping that Proposition 103
would result in lower insurance costs. The measure failed in a large
majority of California's counties. It passed in a few urban counties
in the San Francisco Bay area, where it ran behind Michael
Dukakis, the Democratic party's candidate for President. Crucial to
its passage was the strong support for Proposition 103 in Los Ange-
les and Orange Counties, where it ran well ahead of Dukakis. Or-
ange County voters plainly are not generally liberal on most electoral
issues, and they strongly backed George Bush over Dukakis. How-
ever, they favored Proposition 103. The obvious explanation is that
32. More than $80 million was finally spent for and against the five initiatives,
most of it by the insurance industry ($63.8 million according to final reports). By con-
trast, only $2.9 million was spent by the supporters of Proposition 103, mostly on the
direct mail campaign to raise money and gather signatures. Reich, Insurance Fight Cost
Initiative Backers a Total of $83.9 Million, L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 1989, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
33. The plaintiff lawyers' Proposition 100 received 41 % "ye." votes; the insurance
industry's no-fault Proposition 104 received only 25% "yes" votes; Proposition 101 re-
ceived merely 13% "yes" votes; and Proposition 106 to cut attorneys' fees received 47%
"yes" votes. M. Eu, STATEMENT OF VOTE NOVEMBER 8, 1988, at ix [hereinafter Eu].
34. The margin of victory was less than 250,000 votes out of more than 9 million
cast. Id.; see also, Reich, supra note 15.
35. See Reich, Judge Rejects Suit to Stop State Farm's No-Fault Deductions,
L.A. Times, Aug. 27, 1988, § 1, at 25, col. 1; Reich, Insurers Give Hearing to Indicative
Campaign; $17.6 Million Gathered, L.A. Times, Jul. 30, 1988, § 1, at 23, col. 2.
auto insurance rates in Los Angeles and Orange County are high
and voters there expected substantial savings from Proposition 103.
By contrast, voters in much of the rest of the state, outside of the
San Francisco Bay area, had reason (perhaps good reason as we will
soon see) to fear that Proposition 103 would actually lead to in-
creased auto insurance rates for them.36
II. WHAT PROPOSITION 103 INTENDED
Although the main focus of Proposition 10 337 was auto insurance,
its scope was somewhat broader. Nonetheless, nearly all of the con-
troversy surrounding its adoption and its implementation has con-
cerned auto insurdnce, and we will start there.
A. Auto Insurance
1. Rate Rollbacks
Proposition 103 commanded a rollback of insurance rates to
twenty percent less than they were on November 8, 198738 (a year
prior to the date Proposition 103 was passed). If fully implemented,
Proposition 103 would have frozen those rolled-back rates for a year
after its passage (until November 8, 1989), unless an insurer could
show this would threaten it with insolvency.39 Other things being
equal, if 1988-89 rates were only eighty percent of 1987s rates, most
people's rates would have been at least twenty five percent less than
what they otherwise would have been. This promise of immediate
savings must have looked very appealing to many voters, especially
those California motorists that were spending several thousand dol-
lars a year on auto insurance.
It is perhaps helpful to note here the theory underlying Proposition
103's rate rollback provision. Simply put, it is that the industry has
engaged in noncompetitive price gouging behavior and can well af-
ford sharp rate reductions and still be able to pay all the claims it
faces. Obviously, this theory was hotly contested by the industry.
2. Future Rate Regulation
California traditionally has relied primarily upon competition to
set auto insurance rates. Even though the Insurance Commissioner
36. M. Eu, supra note 33 at 7, 40.
37. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 19, at 98. Proposition 103 amends and repeals
various provisions of law. The most important details of Proposition 103 are contained in
section 3 which adds Article 10, commencing with section 1861.01, to Chapter 9 of Part
2 of Division 1 of the California Insurance Code.
38. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(a) (West Supp. 1990).
39. Id. § 1861.01(b).
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has long had the duty to assure that rates were neither excessive nor
inadequate (thereby endangering the ability of beneficiaries to be
paid their just claims),40 this price control authority was rarely
used.41 Under Proposition 103, prior approval of all proposed rate
hikes is required, and more substantial increases require a public
hearing. 42 In short, even though the hundreds of property and casu-
alty insurers doing business in California at the time Proposition 103
was passed 43 contended that vigorous competition had yielded rela-
tively lower prices, making auto insurance an unprofitable line for
many carriers, the initiative adopted the public utility price regula-
tion approach traditionally used for rate regulation of private gas
and electric companies. 44 The objective of Proposition 103's rate reg-
ulation was to protect policy holders from unjustified price increases
imposed by an industry that is specially exempted from the reach of
the federal antitrust laws 45 and which, at least in some lines and
among some companies, broadly shares cost-relevant actuarial
information.
3. Pricing Criteria
Proposition 103's drafters adopted a moralistic approach to the
way insureds ought to be classified for pricing purposes and broadly
rejected the traditional actuarial categories employed by the indus-
try. The initiative requires that in differentiating premium charges
among insureds the following factors should be considered: first, the
insured's driving safety record; second, the annual number of miles
driven; and third, years of driving experience.48 Other rating factors
may also be used, if approved by the Insurance Commissioner, but
their weight must be less than that given to the three enumerated
40. Proposition 103 re-asserts the broad point by providing that rates may not be
"excessive, inadequate, unfairly discriminatory or otherwise in violation of this chapter."
CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05(a) (West Supp. 1990).
41. Previously, once the Commissioner found an insurance market competitive, the
"excessive" rate inquiry ended. Proposition 103, however, provides in this respect that
"no consideration shall be given to the degree of competition." CAL. INS. CODE §
1861.05(a) (West Supp. 1990).
42. Id. § 1861.05(b)-(c).
43. Reich, Some Insurers Tell State They Will Give Partial Rate Rollbacks, L.A.
Times, June 6, 1989, § 1, at 3, col. 5.
44. See Gastel, Rate Regulation, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE (1990).
Several other American states, however, employ some form of prior rate approval. Id.
45. Id.
46. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(a)(l)-(3) (West Supp. 1990).
factors.47 Moreover, to reinforce the importance of one's own driving
record, insurers are required, in any event, to offer a "good driver
discount" of at least twenty percent to those so defined by Proposi-
tion 103.48
By contrast, before Proposition 103 the insurers largely decided
which criteria to employ in classifying their insureds. The factors
employed by insurers included where the insured lives, the driver's
age, and the driver's sex (especially in the case of younger, unmar-
ried males who paid higher rates) .49 As for using the insured's driv-
ing safety record to set rates, insurers varied in their practices. Some
sharply differentiated among those who had and had not been in ac-
cidents or convicted of driving offenses; others made only modest
price distinctions based on these criteria; and yet others simply re-
fused to insure certain "high risk" drivers.
Proposition 103's backers were particularly opposed to the indus-
try's territorial rating practices, where the insured's place of resi-
dence is considered. For example, drivers in Los Angeles and Orange
Counties were, relatively speaking, involved in more auto accidents
and filed more auto insurance claims with higher average costs per
claim therefore leading to higher rates in those areas.?0 However,
many individuals with clean driving records were resentful that they
had to pay higher rates just for living in those areas. Because of this
resentment, Proposition 103 seeks to substitute both the "good driver
discount" and the heavy weight to be given to an individual's driving
record in place of territorial rating. This substitution explains why
Los Angeles and Orange County residents with good driving records
expected that Proposition 103 would result in even greater rate re-
ductions for them than were promised by the general rate rollback
promised to all drivers. Conversely, the insurance industry widely
advertised in its anti-Proposition 103 campaign that, other things be-
ing equal, the elimination or near-elimination of territorial rating
threatened very sharp rate increases for less congested areas where
auto accident claims were relatively lower. To those concerns, Pro-
position 103 supporters could respond, however, that even in low
claim counties there still would be the rate rollback and the good
driver discount and that these cuts should be greater than the in-
creases due to the end of territorial rating.
As for the other criteria mandated by Proposition 103, the re-
quired use of annual miles driven and years of driving experience
would together probably allow insurers to continue to impose, indi-
47. Id. § 1861.02(a)(4).
48. Id. § 1861.02(b).
49. See Gastel, supra note 44.
50. See, e.g., George, Someone is Pushing the L.A. Bubble, L.A. Times, Dec. 7,
1989, § B, at 7, col. 5.
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rectly, substantially higher premiums on younger males, who, as a
group, have a relatively high accident-involvement history. Yet, once
more, the good driver discount would assure that younger males with
clean records would benefit from their past safer conduct.
4. "Redlining" and Non-Renewal Problems
A further concern of the backers of Proposition 103 was that in
some urban areas, especially where poor and minority people live,
auto insurance at standard rates often seemed impossible to buy,
even for those with good driving records. This problem is said to be
caused by the practice of "redlining." In its narrowest form it occurs
when an insurer draws a "red line" around an entire geographic area
on a map and simply refuses to sell within that area.51 Critics now
include in this definition practices such as artificially limiting the
number of agents who sell in an area, imposing unjustifiably higher
underwriting standards for an area, providing poorer insurance ser-
vice in an area, and arbitrarily imposing higher prices in an area, all
of which, the critics claim, largely amount to the same thing as bla-
tant redlining.52
When insurance is unavailable in the regular (voluntary) market,
Californians are, generally speaking, legally assured the right to
purchase auto insurance through the "assigned risk" plan. Under the
California Automobile Assigned Risk Plan ("CAARP") all the in-
surers doing business in the state must take a share of those driv-
ers.53 Intended for higher risk drivers (who can expect to face diffi-
culties in finding coverage in the voluntary market), CAARP is also
where motorists must turn if they are victims of redlining. Notwith-
standing CAARP and despite the formal California requirement
that owners of all motor vehicles carry liability insurance, a distress-
ingly high proportion-perhaps 25 percent or more-of motorists
statewide are uninsured, 54 and the proportion is considerably higher
in many urban neighborhoods-an astounding 86 percent in certain
51. See PUBLIC ADVOCATES, INC., BROKEN PROMIsEs: THE THIRTY-THIRD INSUR-
ANCE COMMISSIONER'S RECORD ON RED-LINING AND MINORITIES (1990), filed in August
1990 with the Commissioner on behalf of, among others, various named minority and
consumer groups [hereinafter BROKEN PROMISES]. See Ingram, Insurance Chief Accused
of Shortchanging the Poor, San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 28, 1990, § A, at 6, col. 1.
52. BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 51.
53. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 11620-11627 (West 1988); see also CAL. CODE OF REGS.
tit. 10, §§ 2400-2499.7 (1990).
54. Ingram, Law Requiring Proof of Auto Insurance to Expire Tomorrow, San
Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 31, 1990, § A, at 7, col. 1.
poor areas of Los Angeles County.55 In any event, motorists with
clean records in areas who saw themselves as victims of redlining
wanted, not merely access to CAARP (which traditionally provided
relatively expensive policies), but rather access to affordable policies
in the voluntary market. Moreover, there was probably some fear
that insurers would react to the loss of territorial rating mandated by
Proposition 103 by, in effect, redlining much or all of Los Angeles
and Orange Counties, thereby undermining the initiative's central
purpose.
Proposition 103 responds to these concerns by requiring all insur-
ers to offer a policy with a good driver discount to any driver meet-
ing the initiative's requirements, whether or not that driver previ-
ously has been insured by the insurer." The idea, in short, is to
assure, on the one hand, that motorists with good records will not be
dropped by their current carrier and, on the other hand, that good
drivers now outside the voluntary market will truly have access to it
on fair terms.
B. Elected Insurance Commissioner
Before Proposition 103 passed, the Insurance Commissioner was
appointed by the Governor. In keeping with the populist spirit of the
initiative, Proposition 103 provides for the future el6ction of the
Commissioner, starting with the November 1990 election. 7
C. Application to Other Property-Casualty Insurance and Other
Provisions
Although most of the attention and fuss about Proposition 103 has
focused on personal auto insurance, much of it applies to the prop-
erty-casualty industry generally. Most importantly, this includes the
rate rollback and future rate regulation provisions. 8 Hence, among
other things, Proposition 103 intended to boldly impact the pricing
of homeowners' insurance and commercial liability insurance (in-
cluding medical malpractice and product liability insurance). Pro-
position 103 also contains several other general provisions, including
the repeal of the insurance industry's exemption from the state's an-
55. Opatrny, State's Time Bomb for Drivers, San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 9,
1990, § B, at 1, col. 6.
56. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(b) (West Supp. 1990).
57. Id. § 12900.
58. The findings and declarations section of Proposition 103 (Section 1) refers to
property-casualty insurance generally. The rollback and future rate approval provisions
of Proposition 103 add to Chapter 9 of Part 2 of Division I of the Insurance Code, which
applies to property-casualty insurance generally. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 19,
at 99.
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titrust laws,59 the right of banks to enter the insurance business,60
the legalization of group auto and homeowner insurance policies,61
the end of the ban on insurance agents giving rebates to customers
out of the agent's commissions, 62 and the duty of the Insurance De-
partment to provide price and other comparison shopping informa-
tion to insurance consumers.63
III. THE BROAD LEGAL CHALLENGE TO PROPOSITION 103 AND
ITS REVISION BY THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
It was clear to those who had paid attention during the campaign
that the passage of Proposition 103 would only be the beginning of
the battle. The incumbent Insurance Commissioner Roxani Gilles-
pie, a former insurance executive who was assigned the job of imple-
menting the law, had earlier "expressed amazement ... that any
sensible person would consider Proposition 103 to be feasible." '64 And
the industry, which had made clear that it would sue to try to invali-
date Proposition 103, went to court within hours after its passage.
Two days after the election, the California Supreme Court tempo-
rarily suspended the implementation of Proposition 103.65 A month
later, although it lifted that suspension on most of the initiative, it
continued its stay of the implementation of the required twenty per-
cent rate rollback.66 Then on May 4, 1989, the court held that provi-
sion unconstitutional. However, rather than striking down the entire
initiative, the court instead rewrote the relevant legal standard in a
way that, it said, would pass constitutional muster.67
59. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.03(a) (West Supp. 1990). This section specifically ap-
plies the portions of the Business and Professions Code regarding contracts and restraint
of trade to the business of insurance.
60. Section 7 of Proposition 103 repealed California Insurance Code section 1643,
which precluded banks from entering the insurance business. See BALLOT PAMPHLET,
supra note 19, at 141.
61. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.12 (West Supp. 1990).
62. Section 7 of Proposition 103 repeals Article 5 (commencing with Section 750)
of Chapter 1 of Part 2 of Division 1 of the Insurance Code, which provided that insur-
ance companies could not pay rebates to agents and brokers. See BALLOT PAMPHLET,
supra note 19, at 142.
63. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.04 (West Supp. 1990).
64. Reich, Nader Measure on Insurance Stirs Anxiety and Plaudits, L.A. Times,
Sept. 30, 1988, § 1, at 3, col. 4.
65. Sing, 2 Major Car Insurers Lift Ban on New Policies, L.A. Times, Nov. 11,
1988, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
66. Muir & Reich, Prop. 103 Ruling Creates Loophole for Rate Hikes, L.A.
Times, Dec. 9, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
67. See Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 771 P.2d 1247, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 161 (1989). The court also struck down California Insurance Code section
Under Proposition 103, to obtain an exemption from the rate
rollback and freeze, insurers were required to prove to the Commis-
sioner that those rolled-back rates "substantially threatened" them
with "insolvency."6 8 The court decided that this was unconstitution-
ally "confiscatory" and that the insurers were instead entitled to a
"fair and reasonable return" on their equity. 0 In order to protect
those constitutional rights, the court concluded that, during what
was supposed to be the rate rollback and freeze period, the insurers
could actually increase rates from their November 1988 levels, if
needed to assure them a fair return. If subsequent review found
those rates excessive, however, the insurers would owe policyholders
refunds with interest.7 0 Of course, during the period of dispute the
insurers would have the extra money and could earn interest on it
themselves.
In crafting this compromise, the court was immediately criticized
by Professor Stephen Barnett, who pointed out that the initiative, as
rewritten by the court, probably would not have received a majority
vote from the public, especially given its slim margin of victory in
the first place.7 1 Although the court's opinion suggests otherwise, 72
Barnett is surely right that at least a few percent of the "yes" voters,
and likely a rather large share, were critically motivated by the im-
mediate rate cuts promised in the ballot argument and other promo-
tional efforts on behalf of Proposition 103. Nevertheless, the court
concluded that with the modifications the measure should otherwise
remain in place. Hence, while the industry's broad challenge failed,
it was provided with new weapons.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION BATTLES
73
A. Rate Rollbacks and Future Rate Regulation
1. Rate Rollbacks
In the aftermath of the court's first decision on Proposition 103,
the Insurance Commissioner established a procedure which gave in-
surers a choice. They could either comply with the initiative's rate
rollback and freeze provisions, or they could file an application for
1861.10(c) enacted by Proposition 103, which sought to create a consumer-advocacy
corporation.
68. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(b) (West Supp. 1990).
69. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 820, 826, 771 P.2d at 1255, 1259, 258 Cal. Rptr. at
169, 173.
70. Id. at 825, 771 P.2d at 1258, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73.
71. Barnett, Is This The Will of the People? On Prop. 103, Justices Were Good at
Politics, Bad at Law, L.A. Times, May 16, 1989, § 2, at 7, col. 3.
72. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 822, 771 P.2d at 1256, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
73. For a good review of the first year's activities after passage of Proposition 103,
see Reich, Prop. 103: An Upheaval On Hold, L.A. Times, Nov. 8, 1989, § A, at 3, col. 2.
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an exemption with the Insurance Commissioner's office, claiming an
exemption was required to allow a fair rate of return. In June 1989,
Commissioner Gillespie announced that more than 400 insurers, in-
cluding the 15 largest sellers of personal auto insurance, had applied
for such exemptions.7 4 A few companies announced price rollbacks,
especially on their commercial lines, but these announcements cov-
ered a tiny share of the auto insurance market."' Moreover, since
rates in commercial lines had been falling anyway in the past two
years (in a modest reversal of the enormous price increases of the
mid-1980s), some analysts said that the required rollbacks in those
lines meant little or nothing. 6
Implementation at this point required two quite distinct steps.
First, the Commissioner had to determine what would constitute a
fair rate of return. Second, she would have to apply that standard to
the individual insurers in question. On the first step, she initially an-
nounced that 11.2 percent would be the permitted rate of return, but
later explained that this was only a "tentative" figure." She then
appointed retired Superior Court Judge William J. Fernandez to
serve as an administrative law judge to hold hearings to determine
whether 11.2 percent, or some other figure, should be adopted. Also
at stake in those hearings were issues concerning just what types of
income and expenditure items should be considered in calculating
return on equity.
At the hearings, the Insurance Department staff talked about a
fair rate of return of between 11.2 and 15 percent, depending upon
circumstances.78 The industry argued for a sixteen to twenty-one
percent rate of return.7 9 Consumer representatives became unhappy
with the hearings. Among other things, they complained near the
end of the hearings that Fernandez was biased against them because
his wife worked for a law firm whose business is primarily that of
defending insurance companies. The state Attorney General and
others demanded Fernandez' ouster, but the Commissioner declined
74. Reich, 443 Insurers Seek Rollback Exemptions: 15 Top Sellers of Auto Cov-
erage Try to Avoid Prop. 103-Mandated Rate Cuts, L.A. Times, June 27, 1989, § 1, at
3, col. 2.
75. Reich, Less Than 1% of Drivers Get Premiums Cut, L.A. Times, July 30,
1989, § 1, at 3, col. 6.
76. Id.
77. Reich, 11.2% Insurer Profit Standard Could Rise, L.A. Times, Aug. 29, 1989,
§ 1, at 3, col. 5.
78. Reich, Guidelines Awaited on Insurance Profits, L.A. Times, Apr. 6, 1990, §
A, at 26, col. 1.
79. Id.
to remove Fernandez. 80
Finally, in May 1990 (a year after the Supreme Court's original
decision and after months of hearings), Fernandez issued his opin-
ion.81 Expressing grave doubts on the sensibility of regulating insur-
ance prices in the way that public utilities are regulated, Fernandez
nonetheless proposed that for 1988-89 the rate rollback and freeze
required by Proposition 103 would be judged against a standard of
whether that would leave the insurer with a 13.2 percent return on
all of its applicable lines combined. For the future, Fernandez pro-
posed, insurers should be assured rates of return varying line by line
from between 11.2 and 19 percent depending on their circumstances.
He also recommended that political contributions, lobbying expenses,
and charitable contributions should be excluded from allowable ex-
penditures in deciding what was an insurer's rate of return."
However, when it came time to rule on Fernandez' recommenda-
tions, Gillespie returned to her earlier "tentative" position, declaring
that for the rollback year insurers would be entitled only to a 11.2
percent return.83 For the future, she generally adopted Fernandez'
proposed 11.2 to 19 percent range. However, whereas Fernandez
proposed to allow, for example, insurer executive salaries of any
amount, Gillespie determined that various expenses would be al-
lowed only up to a specified cap in determining the company's rate
of return. Gillespie also announced that a large number of insurance
lines, apart from personal auto insurance, would likely be treated
specially and not subject to the general rate of return methodology
she was adopting.84
Taking the next step, the Commissioner called in five insurers for
rollback hearings in which individualized determinations would be
made as to what rates they required to obtain the rate of return she
had decided to permit.85 Several insurers quickly sued to try to block
those hearings, but after an initial ruling to the contrary the trial
80. Reich, Gillespie is Prodded to Remove Hearing Judge, L.A. Times, Apr. 14,
1990, § A, at 19, col. 1.
81. In the Matters of Various Rate Increase Applications and With Respect to
Certain Issues Related to the Control, Review and Approval of Insurance Rates Pursu-
ant to Insurance Code Sections 1861.01(a) and 1861.05 and Related Laws, File No.
REB-1002 (Ins. Comm'r May 3, 1990) (proposed decision).
82. Reich, Standard of Insurance Rollbacks Suggested, L.A. Times, May 8, 1990,
§ A, at 3, col. 5.
83. In the Matters of Various Rate Increase Applications and With Respect to
Certain Issues Related to the Control, Review and Approval of Insurance Rates Pursu-
ant to Insurance Code Sections 1861.01 (a) and 1861.05 and Related Laws. File No.
REB-1002, (Ins. Comm'r June 15, 1990) (decision). For the regulations, see CAL. CODE
OF REGS. tit. 10, §§ 2534.1-2639.5 (1990) (Review and Rollback of Insurance Rates).
84. Reich, Gillespie Rebate Action Draws Sharp Criticism, L.A. Times, June 14,
1990, § A, at 1, col. 2.
85. Insurance Rollback Hearings Scheduled, L.A. Times, June 20, 1990, § A, at
18, col. 1.
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court judge hearing the case concluded that the insurers would not
be able to challenge the Commissioner's position until they had re-
ceived specific rollback orders. 8 Thus, the stage was finally set for
hearings on the rollbacks.
The first of the rollback hearings was held (involving two insurers)
and, as this article was completed, the parties were awaiting the de-
cisions of the administrative law judge, and then the Commis-
sioner. 87 In any event, it is clear that once any company is actually
ordered to rebate money on the ground that their 1988-89 rates pro-
vided more than an 11.2 percent rate of return, that order will once
more be challenged in court. Hence the prospect of many consumers
actually receiving cash back for the 1988-89 year still seems a long
way off, and many now doubt that this will ever occur.
2. Future Rate Regulation
As explained above, proposition 103 also included a provision
designed to regulate future rate increases.88 In October 1989, know-
ing (despite the November 1989 deadline) that the system for ap-
proving future rate increases would be a while in coming, and in the
face of an announced rate increase by Farmers Insurance, one of the
larger auto insurers in California, Commissioner Gillespie ordered a
freeze on all current auto insurance rates. The price freeze was ex-
tended in August 1990, and remains in effect as of this writing.89
Once Fernandez finally issued his opinion, Gillespie announced her
ruling on the procedures and standards that would govern future rate
regulation and set that process in motion. 0 The first of those prior
approval hearings was held in September 1990, and it appears that
the process and standards are not too burdensome for the insurers.91
86. United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Gillespie, No. JCCP2419, (Cal. Super.
Ct., L.A. County 1990); Reich, Hearings OKd on Insurance Rate Rollbacks, L.A.
Times, Aug. 1, 1990, § A, at 3, col. 5.
87. Reich, Prop. 103 Rate Rollback Hearings Begin, L.A. Times, Sept. 25, 1990,§ A, at 24, col. 4.
88. See supra text accompanying note 41.
89. Private Passenger Automobile Rating Factors, CAL. CODE OF REGS., tit. 10,
ch. 5, subch. 4.6 (amended by Commissioner's order on October 3, 1989) [hereinafter
Rating Factors]. For later details, see Reich, Ban on Auto Rate Hikes to be Extended,
L.A. Times, Aug. 7, 1990, § A, at 19, col. 1.
90. CAL. CODE OF REGS. tit. 10, §§ 2640.1-2648.5 (1990) (Prior Approval of Prop-
erty and Casualty Insurance Rates).
91. 1 base this conclusion on telephone interviews of lawyers involved in the process
on behalf of the insurers and with Milo Pearson, Department of Insurance (Nov. 19,
1990).
It is unclear, however, whether the resulting rates will be any less
than they would have been without the initiative. Although rate in-
creases will probably be approved by Gillespie before she leaves her
job at the end of 1990, because consumer groups and the supporters
of Proposition 103 boycotted the prior approval hearings, it is possi-
ble that they will seek to block in court any rate increases that are
granted.
B. Withdrawing from the California Insurance Market
In addition to the broad legal challenge that followed Proposition
103's passage, some insurers announced they would either com-
pletely cease doing business in California or at least temporarily not
insure any new customers. The announcement by Travelers Corpora-
tion92 that it was not renewing its auto or homeowners policies led to
a second California Supreme Court decision on Proposition 103. In
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Gillespie,3 the Commissioner argued
that before withdrawing from the state, Travelers would have to find
other carriers for the customers that it would not renew. However, at
the end of January 1990, by a 4 to 3 vote, the court ruled otherwise,
concluding that Proposition 103 does not prevent an insurer from
simply discontinuing its California business. 94 To the contrary, the
court noted that the initiative seems to contemplate the withdrawal
of insurers and envisions that, if necessary, the Commissioner could
create a joint underwriting authority to deal with the problem."5
Formal withdrawal is not the only option, however. While Trav-
elers was being decided, independent insurance agents and brokers
charged that some insurers had cut the commissions they would pay,
thereby discouraging agents from making sales, as a more covert
method of leaving the California market.96 Yet it remains doubtful
whether, in the end, any of the major sellers of auto insurance will
choose to leave the very large California market regardless of their
right to do so.
C. Territorial Rating and Redlining, Individual Non-Renewal
and Unwillingness to Sell, and the Assigned Risk Plan
Starting in June 1989, the Commissioner held several hearings on
Proposition 103's pricing criteria that were meant largely to elimi-
92. Sing & Reich, Travelers D~fies Prop. 103 with No-Renewal Notices, L.A.
Times, Dec. 10, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
93. 50 Cal. 3d 82, 785 P.2d 500, 266 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1990).
94. Id. at 94, 785 P.2d at 510, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 124; see also Hager, Insurers
May Quit State, Court Rules, L.A. Times, Jan. 30, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 5.
95. Travelers Indemnity, 50 Cal. 3d at 94, 785 P.2d at 510, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
96. Reich, Agents Angered by Insurers' Cut in Commissions, L.A. Times, Nov.
10, 1989, § A, at 3, col. 5.
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nate the use of territory in setting prices. At those hearings, insurers
urged the continued use of territory. Notwithstanding the seemingly
plain language of the initiative, Gillespie has been very concerned
about ordering changes that could sharply increase the rates of many
drivers outside of the Los Angeles county area, something she and
the Insurance Department staff believe would follow from the simple
elimination of territorial rating. 7 In any event, on the second anni-
versary of the enactment of Proposition 103, no firm resolution of
this issue has occurred.
The Commissioner has been criticized by representatives of poor
people in inner cities who claim that the current territorial-based
pricing criterion unfairly discriminate against them.98 Some have
talked of providing public subsidies to poor inner city residents, but
given the state's own budget problems, this is probably not politically
viable.99 Gillespie has talked about explicitly subsidizing low income
drivers who are in the assigned risk plan,100 but this might still leave
the cost too high, causing many to continue to go without coverage.
Besides, the issue of which other drivers should pay for that subsidy
is highly controversial.
Of course, the burden that good drivers outside of the large urban
areas would feel from the end of territorial rating could be at least
partly relieved by loading up even more of the costs on those that
Proposition 103 defines as "bad drivers" - those with two or more
recent convictions for "moving violations."''1 However, because this
group represents a small share of the motorists - the Department of
Motor Vehicles estimates that eighty percent of California motorists
qualify as "good drivers" under the initiative's definitions0 2 - ex-
tremely large increases would have to be imposed on the "bad driv-
ers" to have much of an impact on the rates paid by the others.
In the face of this controversy, in December 1989 the Commis-
sioner issued an initial set of emergency regulations announcing new
criteria (or rating factors) on which to base auto insurance pric-
97. Mims, 103's Yield- A Bitter Taste, SACRAMENTO Bus. J., May 7, 1990, § 1,
at 17.
98. Reich, Prop. 103 Group Offers Its Own Pricing Plan, L.A. Times, Dec. 1,
1989, § A, at 33, col. 1; Reich, Delay Expected in Auto Policy Pricing System, L.A.
Times, Nov. 15, 1989, § A, at 3, col. 5.
99. Reich, Prop. 103's Crux Persists for Gillespie, L.A. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, §
A, at 3, col. 1.
100. Id.
101. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(b)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
102. Mims, supra note 97.
ing.1 03 They emphasized (as required by Proposition 103) a driver's
safety record, annual miles driven, and years of driving experience.
The proposed rating factors would also, among other things, elimi-
nate the use of age, sex and marital status, as well as the traditional
territorial rating. Yet the regulations would permit, to a limited ex-
tent, partial substitutes for the latter such as the locality's population
density, traffic density and litigation rates. Nonetheless, it was
widely agreed within the industry that the new approach would have
led to major rate increases in some areas. To prevent that, the Com-
missioner's regulations also would impose a cap on premium rate in-
creases that is tied to the consumer price index.
These regulations were challenged, and in May 1990, then Supe-
rior Court Judge Miriam Vogel in Los Angeles decided that they
were invalid and ordered the Commissioner to draft another plan. 104
In response, the Commissioner both appealed the decision and
adopted revised emergency regulations intended to comply with
Judge Vogel's order. 1 5 Those regulations will also likely force a sig-
nificant change in the rates many motorists face, but probably a con-
siderably smaller change than the Commissioner's initial regulations
would have required. Simply put, the regulations issued pursuant to
Judge Vogel's order require the insurers to take Proposition 103's
mandatory factors into account first, but (in contrast to the Commis-
sioner's initial regulations) they are only to be given the weight to
which they are actuarially entitled. After that, the optional factors
may be considered and given their proper actuarial weight. The re-
sult, apparently, will be to permit territorial differences to play a
role, although not as large a role as they traditionally have played.10 8
Starting in September 1990, simultaneously with the first prior
rate approval hearings, hearings were held on the participating in-
surers' new rating plans. 10 7 Those plans are to be measured against
the revised emergency regulations. Subsequently, the Commissioner
announced hearings that look toward making those revised regula-
103. Rating Factors, supra note 89 (emergency regulations as of December 18,
1989). Reich, Gillespie Curtails Zip Code Pricing on Car Insurance, L.A. Times, Dec. 6,
1989, § A, at 1, col. 5; see also Reich, Prop. 103 Rules Shed Little Light on Rates, L.A.
Times, Dec. 11, 1989, § B, at 3, col. 6; Reich, Agency OKs Guidelines for Pricing of
Auto Insurance, L.A. Times, Dec. 16, 1989, § A, at 35, col. 2.
104. Proposition 103 Implementation Cases, No. JCC 002419 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1990) and Order Granting Preliminary Injunction Motions, filed May 18, 1990. Reich,
Insurance Price Plan Struck Down, L.A. Times, May 5, 1990, § A, at 27, col. i.
105. For a discussion and chronology, see 90 Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg., 40-Z,
at 1484 (Oct. 5, 1990) [hereinafter Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg.].
106. As compared with Gillespie's initial regulations, those issued in response to
Judge Vogel's decision also permit the use of age, gender, and marital status in setting
rates. Id. The newer regulations also do not include the cost of living cap contained in the
initial regulations.
107. Initially only three insurers were involved. Telephone interview with Milo
Pearson, Department of Insurance (Nov. 19, 1990).
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tions permanent, at least while her appeal to reinstate her initial reg-
ulations is pending.108 As of the second anniversary of Proposition
103, it was unclear whether the Commissioner will, in the end, vigor-
ously press her appeal of Judge Vogel's decision on-this issue. In any
case, the rating factors issue remains unresolved at this writing and
could possibly head down a different path once the newly elected
Commissioner takes office.1"9
Along with the battle over permissible rating factors, two other
related fights were going on. In February 1989, CAARP asked for a
112.3 percent increase in rates in the assigned risk plan which was
then covering nearly 800,000 drivers. Although an administrative
law judge issued a proposed decision granting the increase, the Com-
missioner rejected this decision and the rate increase.110 The insurers
took the matter to court, but as of November 1990, the question of
proper rates for CAARP was also undecided."' The Commissioner
had ruled that an "interim increase" of eighty-five percent would be
allowed."" In ongoing hearings on the issue, however, CAARP now
seeks a rate hike of more than 160 percent.113
Turning to the other related issue "good drivers" in "redlined"
areas are supposed to be buying insurance in the standard market
and obtaining price discounts as well."x However, this practice fre-
quently does not happen. For one thing, it is estimated that more
than half of the motorists currently purchasing auto insurance
through CAARP qualify as "good drivers.""1l5 There appear to be
two related explanations for this situation. First, some motorists have
opted into the assigned risk plan because they have found that the
108. See Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg., supra note 105; see also Rating Factors,
supra note 89.
109. For details of the election, see infra text accompanying notes 126-27.
110. In the Matter of the Rate Increase Application of California Automobile As-
signed Risk Plan, File No. REB-1001 (Ins. Comm'r Dec. 1989) (decisions of administra-
tive law judge and the Commissioner).
111. For later developments, see Reich, Assigned-Risk Rates Must Rise, Judge
Tells Gillespie, L.A. Times, Apr. 21, 1990, § A, at 24, col. 1. See also Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Gillespie, No. C744670 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 1989) (statement of decision, prelim-
inary injunction, and peremptory writ of mandate); CAARP v. Gillespie, No. C755745
(Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 1990) (statement of decision); CAARP v. Gillespie, No.
C755745 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 1990) (judgment on petition for writ of administra-
tive mandamus).
112. In the Matter of the Rates of the California Automobile Assigned Risk Plan,
(Ins. Comm'r Sept. 18, 1990) (interim order setting rates); Reich, Assigned Risk Rates
to Rise Average of 85%, L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 2.
113. Reich, supra note 112.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
115. Mims, supra note 97.
rates offered there are actually less than the rates available to them
in the voluntary market (because the assigned risk rates are cur-
rently subsidized and the traditional rating factors employed in the
standard market remain in place). Second, other good drivers are in
the assigned risk plan unhappily and involuntarily, claiming that
they qualify for lower rates in the standard market but cannot find
an insurer to sell them a regular policy notwithstanding the provi-
sions of Proposition 103.118
Finding that the Commissioner had ignored a large number of
consumer complaints about violations of the rules relating to
CAARP requiring insurers to "serve all comers" (at least those who
are good drivers), a trial court judge in San Francisco ordered the
Insurance Commissioner to act on the complaints and, where appro-
priate, to prosecute those companies.""' Although the Commissioner
appealed this decision, claiming that the handling of public com-
plaints is a matter for her discretion, in March 1990, she ordered
insurers to comply with the "take all good drivers" provision of Pro-
position 103.118 Yet, it is by no means clear that insurers have been
complying with the law's requirement.
The main controversy here has been the terms on which insurers
must take those who qualify as "good drivers" under the initiative's
definitions. Many insurers have refused coverage in their regular
company to some of those drivers and have instead only agreed to
provide coverage through a separate company that they use when
insuring "substandard risks" (and at higher rates). The insurers
claim that this procedure is permissible treatment of those who qual-
ify as "good drivers" under the initiative, but who nonetheless do not
meet the normal criteria for coverage with the regular company.
Others claim this is not permitted by the initiative. Hence, the issue
has been tied up in litigation."1 9 However, it now appears that at
least this problem will be resolved. Under their new rating plans,
filed by auto insurers with the Commissioner in September and Oc-
tober 1990, many insurers proposed to cover in their regular com-
pany all those who are "good drivers" under the initiative (although
some are reserving the right to offer even lower rates to "super"
good drivers).120 Moreover, this outcome is now legally required of
116. See supra text accompanying notes 46-56 for a discussion of the factors that
lead to this situation.
117. Reich, Only Lawyers Winning So Far on Prop. 103, L.A. Times, Dec. 15,
1989, § A, at 3, col. 2.
118. Reich, Insurance Firms Accused of Ignoring 'All-Comers' Rule on Selling
Policies, L.A. Times, Mar. 3, 1990, § A, at 29, col. 1.
119. Id.
120. Telephone interview with Paul Alexander, Esq., counsel to a major insurer
involved in the hearings (Oct. 23, 1990).
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the insurers pursuant to the recently passed Assembly Bill 2737.121
In April 1990, CAARP announced that "good drivers" would no
longer be eligible for that plan on the ground that Proposition 103
made it no longer necessary for CAARP to accept those drivers who
were supposed to be assured access to a policy and a good driver
discount with a regular carrier.12  By that point membership in the
assigned risk plan had grown to more than 1 million, and more than
half of them were still "good drivers" under Proposition 103.123 In
the ensuing litigation, Judge Vogel, hoping it would eliminate good
drivers from the assigned risk plan, approved a solution that requires
those seeking coverage under the assigned risk plan to swear under
penalty of perjury that they were denied coverage in the voluntary
market.1 24 This practice might also serve to identify companies that
simply refuse coverage to good drivers in violation of the initiative. It
is unclear how effective this procedure has been. However, the in-
terim eighty-five percent rate increase for the assigned risk plan (de-
scribed above) is likely to be quite effective because it appears
largely to eliminate any financial advantage that good drivers have
had in seeking coverage in the assigned risk plan.
D. Other Developments or Lack Thereof
So far, there has been no significant entry by banks into the insur-
ance market although some may be selling annuities.125 Nor has
there developed a practice of having agents rebate a share of their
commissions to consumers, which is permitted by Proposition 103.
Nor, apparently, have group insurance plans developed in new fields
as contemplated by Proposition 103.
As noted above, Insurance Commissioner Gillespie, a Republican,
decided not to run for office. The party primary held in the summer
of 1990 narrowed the field to a single Democrat and a single Repub-
lican who squared off in November 1990. On November 6, 1990 for-
mer state Senator John Garamendi, the Democrat, was elected by a
comfortable margin.126 It is perhaps worth noting that after his se-
121. Lucas, Deukmejian Signs Butte County Bailout, Good Driver Discount, San
Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 25, 1990, § A, at 9, col. 1.
122. Reich, Assigned Risk Motorist Policies to be Restricted, L.A. Times, Apr. 6,
1990, § A, at 3, col. 3; see also Reich, Gillespie Will Oppose Plan to Limit Assigned
Risk Eligibility, L.A. Times, Apr. 11, 1990, § A, at 3, col. 1.
123. Reich, Assigned Risk Motorist Policies to be Restricted, supra note 122.
124. Gillespie v. CAARP, No. JCCP2419 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County 1990).
125. L.A. Times, Apr. 9, 1990, § D, at 2, col. 1.
126. Garamendi defeated his opponent by one million votes. See L.A. Times, Nov.
lection as a nominee, Garamendi said that Proposition 103 "needs to
be rewritten" and vowed to make the commissioner's office "the na-
tion's best consumer protection agency. "127
V. ALTERNATIVES
A. Voter Revolt Again?
Dismayed by the slow pace of implementation of Proposition 103,
in late 1989 Voter Revolt announced that it would try to put a new
initiative on the November 1990 ballot.1"8 This proposal would have
created a state monopoly to take over the auto insurance field if by
September 1991, either rates had not been reduced to twenty percent
below November 1987 levels (as Proposition 103 had originally
promised) or more than fifteen percent of the state's motorists were
uninsured. This plan, said to be based in part on experience in Brit-
ish Columbia, failed to obtain sufficient signatures in the required
period to be placed on the ballot. In July 1990, Voter Revolt pro-
claimed that it would make a second try, which, if successful, would
have placed the new initiative on the June 1992 ballot; but later it
conceded that this effort also failed.1" Given what must be growing
public disenchantment with the failure of Proposition 103 to achieve
its objectives, perhaps Voter Revolt has lost some of its credibility
with the voters.
B. Auto No-Fault Again?
Many have concluded that if the price of auto insurance is to
come down, it will require a reduction in the underlying costs of the
tort-liability insurance system. They believe that simply commanding
price reductions, as Proposition 103 did, just will not work, especially
now that the California Supreme Court has decided that the insurers
are entitled to a fair return on their capital. It has long been clear
that, in the right form, an auto no-fault plan can take costs out of
the system and thereby pave the way to lower insurance rates.1 30
Therefore, despite the resounding defeat by the voters of Proposition
104 (the insurance industry's no-fault proposal), some have once
8, 1990, § A, at 36, col. 1.
127. Reich & Myers, A Turn in the Quest for Consumer Relief, L.A. Times, June
7, 1990, § A, at 3, col. 2.
128. See Reich, New Insurance Initiative Unveiled, L.A. Times, Dec. 20, 1989, §
A, at 15, col. I (article includes an outline of the proposal); see also, Rosenfield, Califor-
nia's Unfinished Revolution, L.A. Times, Nov. 8, 1989, § B, at 7, col. 1.
129. For the initial announcement see Reich, Judge's Action Blocks Car Insurance
Rebates, L.A. Times, July 20, 1990, § A, at 3, col. 4. For the concession, see Reich,
Insurance War Fades, But New Issues Evolving, L.A. Times, Nov. 25, 1990, § A, at 1,
col. 4.
130. COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMs, supra note 16.
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more promoted no-fault in the legislature, hoping that the wide-
spread sentiment that something must be done to lower rates will
help overcome the opposition of the plaintiffs' lawyers.
Democrat Patrick Johnston, chairperson of the California Assem-
bly's Finance and Insurance Committee, has led this effort ever since
the passage of Proposition 103, so far without success. Initially John-
ston proposed a generous no-fault plan based on the New York sys-
tem. In brief, this plan was an improved version of Proposition 104
without special protections for the insurance industry.131 Although
he won the support of leading consumer groups, the bill made little
headway in the legislature.
More recently Johnston and Consumer's Union have concentrated
their efforts on what has been called a "low-cost no-frills" plan that
has also been endorsed by groups representing low income motor-
ists. 132 Although its sponsors are apparently seeking to shed the "no
fault" label, this plan is essentially a modest no-fault scheme - con-
taining moderate first party benefits (less generous than New
York's) and eliminating tort claims only in minor injury cases (and
hence curtailing victim rights to a lesser degree than New York
does). One key argument of the sponsors is that many more Califor-
nia motorists will buy auto insurance if they can acquire this pack-
age for $180 to $200 a year instead of paying at least $675 annually
for minimum coverage from the assigned risk plan (and with the
prospect of much higher costs in the future now that CAARP is
poised to increase its rates dramatically). Moreover, Johnston's
backers argue that low income, people as a class who currently
purchase the assigned risk plan policy actually would be better
served in terms of protection by the new low-cost no-frills policy.
The plaintiffs' lawyers remain strongly opposed to auto no-fault
under any name. Their key supporter is Democratic Assemblyman.
Willie Brown, the speaker of the Assembly, who is thought by many
to be the most politically powerful of all California state legisla-
tors.1 33 As an alternative, Brown first favored a low-cost plan that
basically maintains the traditional system. The insurers assert that
131. Shuit, Panel Approves Insurer-Backed No-Fault Bill, L.A. Times, Apr. 19,
1989, § 1, at 3, col. 2.
132. Snyder, Logjam Puts More Uninsured on the Road, L.A. Times, Aug. 29,
1990, § B, at 7, col. 1; Weintraub, Car Insurance Bill's Death Is Laid to Brown, L.A.
Times, Jan. 18, 1990, § A, at 3, col. 5; Reich, Push Starts for No-Frills, No-Fault Car
Insurance, L.A. Times, May 24, 1989, § 1, at 3, col. 5.
133. See Dowie, The King of Juice, 11 CALIFORNIA MAGAZINE 77, 85 (1986);
Paddock, A Speaker of Prominence, 15 STATE LEGISLATURES 22 (1989).
this scheme is simply not financially viable and the Governor has
sided with them, vetoing the version that the legislature passed in the
fall of 1989.134 In 1990, Brown's aides were back with a modified
plan.135 At an annual cost variously estimated at between $180 and
$425 a year, good drivers of all income levels could obtain $15,000
of liability insurance protection for bodily injury ($30,000 if two or
more people were hurt in the same accident) plus $5000 in liability
insurance for property damage. However, the coverage would only
apply to economic losses and not to pain and suffering. The tort sys-
tem would remain in place, but the bill's backers assume that if
poorer people purchased the coverage, those they injured would not
bother to try to collect more than the insurance provided. At the
same time, with the coverage restricted in this way, the price could
be lowered to somewhere in the estimated range.
Nonetheless, this proposal has run into criticism. The plaintiffs'
lawyers say it is too much like no-fault, the insurers claim it isn't
enough no-fault, and Consumer's Union says insurers would have too
little incentive to pay deserving claims. Given this opposition, the
Governor was also unwilling to lend his support, and the 1990 legis-
lative session ended with no action taken. 36
C. Elective No-Fault?
Professor Jeffrey O'Connell, an early advocate of auto no-fault
plans in the United States, has recently proposed a different ap-
proach to the auto insurance problem.37 Rather than trying to have
the legislature adopt a no-fault scheme, the decision should be left to
individual motorists. In O'Connell's view, the "elective" no-fault idea
has several virtues. First, it sidesteps the political process; the choice
to stay with the fault system or shift to no-fault is made in the quiet
of the insurance agent's office. Second, it is harder for the plaintiffs'
attorneys to oppose; it merely gives consumers a choice. Third, the
choice would be exclusive, thus preventing the undesirable outcome
that has occurred in many American states in which modest no-fault
has been layered in on top of the traditional system.
134. California Speaker. Governor, Target Auto Reform, Nat'l Under-
writer-Prop. & Casualty, May 7, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter Auto Reform].
135. Weintraub, Accord May Be Near on Good Driver Policy, L.A. Times, May
23, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 3.
136. Senate Panel Turns Down Low-Cost Insurance Plan, United Press Interna-
tional (June 28, 1990) (available on NEXIS). The day after his election incoming Com-
missioner Giramendi said he wanted to "move away from the focus on no-fault." Reich,
California Elections: Insurance Commissioner, L.A. Times, Nov. 8, 1990, § A, at 36,
col. 1.
137. O'Connell, No-Fault Auto Insurance: Back By Popular (Market) Demand?,
26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 993 (1989); O'Connell & Joost, Giving Motorists A Choice Be-
tween Fault and No-Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REv. 61 (1986).
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Under the elective no-fault scheme, in a two car accident involving
two no-fault-electing drivers, both would claim from their own insur-
ers for out-of-pocket economic losses (medical expenses, lost income
and the like) on a no-fault basis. In a two car accident involving two
fault-electing drivers, they would be able to sue and be sued by each
other just as today. In accidents involving fault-electing and no-
fault-electing drivers, there would be no lawsuit. No-fault-electing
drivers would turn to their no-fault insurers. Fault-electing drivers
would turn to a special new clause in their own insurance policies
that O'Connell calls "connector" coverage. This connector coverage
is very much like the uninsured motorist coverage that most Califor-
nia motorists with insurance already carry. Under this coverage,
fault-electing drivers may recover tort-based damages (including
pain and suffering) from their own insurers, but only if the other
(no-fault-electing) driver was at fault.
While it imposes an extra insurance cost on the fault-electing
driver, that driver also saves money because he cannot be sued when
he carelessly injures someone electing the no-fault scheme. If it all
works out as intended, the result would probably be thought quite
fair by most people, and O'Connell has suggested some clever tech-
niques to deal with the claims of potential unfairness that have been
raised. He anticipates that, over time, nearly all would choose the
no-fault option - not only because it would be cheaper, but also
because they would come to believe, as he does, that it provides bet-
ter protection, even though it would not permit recovery for pain and
suffering even in serious injury cases.
Although an elective no-fault bill has been introduced in the Cali-
fornia legislature, so far it has won few supporters.138 There was a
test of the elective no-fault idea in November 1990 in Arizona where
an elective no-fault plan was put on the ballot through the initiative
process. However, it was badly defeated. 13 9 Whether this solution
could become politically viable in California remains to be seen.
D. A New Idea
I have recently made an alternative proposal 40 that is in the spirit
of Proposition 103 because it would slash auto insurance costs and
138. Auto Reform, supra note 134.
139. For background, see Gastel, No-Fault Auto Insurance, Insurance Information
Institute (1990) (available on NEXIS). The Arizona no-fault initiative was voted down
by 85% of the voters. See USA Today, Nov. 8, 1990, at 6A.
140. Sugarman, Foreword: Choosing Among Systems of Auto Insurance for Per-
because people would be charged according to their miles driven,
their driving experience, and their driving conduct. Unlike Proposi-
tion 103, this plan would both sharply reduce the underlying costs of
the system and, for a very large number of drivers, substantially
broaden their coverage in case they are in an auto accident. More-
over, it would essentially solve the problem of uninsured motorists.
Whether it could obtain substantial legislative support is another
matter, however, because it would do away with lawsuits among mo-
torists, and it would radically change the role played by auto
insurers.
Instead of filing lawsuits, auto accident victims would file claims
with a newly created public Auto Accident Compensation Corpora-
tion ("AACC"). The AACC would compensate auto accident vic-
tims after obtaining its revenues from the motoring public in new
ways. The AACC's first revenue source would come from an in-
crease in the state gasoline tax. This approach generally makes those
who drive more pay more. (At the same time, this gives a deserved
reward to those with fuel-efficient cars.) Second, car registration and
driving license fees would be increased, and those fees would be ad-
justed to reflect both past driving conduct and the likelihood that the
driver would be in an accident in the future. For example, new driv-
ers and those with traffic citations would be asked to pay more.
Third, there would be a tax on new car sales that varied to reflect
the accident history of the model in question. This would reward
manufacturers and consumers of safer cars. Because these funding
sources would be difficult to avoid, the uninsured motorist problem
would largely disappear.
Although motorists would face new costs, they would no longer
have to buy auto liability insurance covering bodily injury because
they could not be sued for injuring others, nor would they have to
purchase uninsured motorist insurance because they could claim
from the AACC. The savings achieved by motorists who are cur-
rently insured should far exceed the new expenses they would face.
The most important reason for this is that there would be enormous
administrative savings from this plan. Think of the reductions in
auto insurance advertising expense, in commissions for insurance
agents and brokers, and, most significantly, in lawyers' fees. In addi-
tion, there would be many new contributors because those who now
fail to purchase insurance would be brought into the scheme, making
it not only cheaper for everyone else, but also fairer.
Moreover, if, as in Michigan,141 lawsuits were no longer permitted
sonal Injury, 26 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 977 (1989); see also Sugarman, How To Slash Car
Insurance Costs, Sacramento Bee, Apr. 1, 1990, Forum, at 1, col. 1.
141. For Michigan details, see Conard, Coup de Grace for Personal Injury Torts?,
88 MIcH. L. REV. 1557, 1567 n.42 (1990).
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for property damage to cars, most people could dispense with sepa-
rate auto insurance altogether. They would no longer need liability
protection for damaging other cars. What protection they needed
could easily be built into homeowner's (and renter's) insurance that
most people carry. More specifically, people would insure their own
cars from damage in the same policy in which they insure their
house, their furniture and their other possessions; and to the extent
they would remain liable for damage to property other than autos,
this exposure could easily be covered by the general liability provi-
sion of homeowner's (and renter's) insurance that now protects them
from lawsuits for slips and falls on their property and the like. Of
course, those without homeowner's (or renter's) insurance could con-
tinue to buy a relatively inexpensive, stripped-down, auto policy cov-
ering both damage to their own car and non-auto property damage
that they might negligently impose on others.
Returning to the AACC, under my proposal auto accident victims
would be able to recover all reasonably incurred and otherwise not
reimbursed medical expense of up to $500,000 per person. The
AACC would also cover unreimbursed income losses (in both disa-
bility and death cases) of up to $4000 a month (which is more than
what 90 percent of Californians earn) for so long as necessary. The
AACC would also pay for other reasonably incurred expenditures
for rehabilitation, replacement services and the like. It would even be
possible to pay moderate sums (up to, say, $50,000) for pain and
suffering to those auto accident victims who suffer a serious disfig-
urement, a substantial permanent impairment, or who are prevented
by the accident from returning to their normal activities for more
than three months.
Claimants would recover regardless of who caused their injury, al-
though there would be an exclusion for intentionally self-inflicted in-
juries and, if this were desired, for an alcohol- or drug-impaired
driver whose impairment causes the injury. Unlike the current sys-
tem, victims would not be blocked from recovery because the other
driver was uninsured or could not be proved to be at fault in causing
the accident. Those individuals wanting more protection could, of
course, purchase it in the private market. Most high earners, how-
ever, want greater income loss protection for more than just auto
accidents and would purchase instead, as many already do, general
disability insurance protection.
There is, of course, some danger that as a public organization the
AACC would become politicized or inefficient. However, with care-
ful planning these risks could be minimized. Moreover, to avoid the
hiring of state employees to process claims, the AACC could be di-
rected to draw upon the expertise of the private sector by contracting
out to insurance companies the claims administration function. 142
CONCLUSION
Proposition 103 could wind up leaving Californians with little
more than a larger bureaucracy in the Department of Insurance.
Under this scenario: (1) no significant rate rollbacks occur because
most insurers will be able to demonstrate that their rates for 1988-89
did not yield a rate of return above the permitted level; (2) future
rate increases will be little different from what they would have been
without Proposition 103 because of the 11.2 to 19 percent rates .of
return that are to be allowed;1 43 (3) one way or another, territorial
rating, or some close proxy for it, will remain a key variable in the
pricing of auto insurance; and (4) although good drivers may be as-
sured access to policies with standard rates, those rates will be suffi-
ciently high that no significant dent will be made in the number of
California motorists without insurance. Indeed, with large price in-,
creases in the assigned risk plan, there may well be a sharp upturn in
the number of motorists without liability insurance in California, es-
pecially because the portion of the mandatory insurance law which
requires drivers stopped for traffic violations to show proof of insur-
ance expires at the start of 1991.144
Yet, even if Proposition 103 ultimately fails to achieve its propo-
nents' goals, perhaps there is now sufficient pressure to contain insur-
ance prices that new legislation (or possibly yet another initiative)
will make more fundamental changes of the sort just described in the
underlying structure of tort law, the property-casualty industry, or
both.
142. There are several plan details still to be worked out, including, for example,
the corporate structure and method of selection of directors of the AACC and a mecha-
nism for dealing with the legal liabilities of California motorists who drive in other
states.
143. To be sure, because of the Commissioner's auto insurance rate freeze, con-
sumers have enjoyed stable premiums for the first two years since Proposition 103's en-
actment. This appears to be the initiative's main achievement for consumers. Whether
the freeze has also meant, for example, worse service from agents and more aggressive
resisting of claims is unclear - but it would not be a surprising result assuming that the
freeze has kept rates below market levels. See, e.g., Sugarman, Why Proposition 103
Will Fail, San Diego Union, May 14, 1989, § C, at 1, col. 1.
144. For discussions of the potential impact, see Ingram, supra note 54, and
Opatrny, supra note 55.
